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Abstract 
Never Again! Genocide and the International Community 
Resumen 
¡Nunca Más! El genocidio y la Comunidad Internacional 
The term "genocide" refers to the worst of crimes. 
Yet, although it involves complex social processes with 
enormous impacts on individuals and societies, it has 
been rather neglected by social scientists. This is due 
in part to the fact that the international legal 
definition of "genocide" is unclear and unsatisfactory, 
and also in part to the methodological problems of 
comparing large-scale events. The article proposes a 
methodological solution to these problems —involving 
the use of Weber’s ideal type— and offers a critical 
review of the leading explanatory theories of 
genocide. It concludes that these theories offer 
considerable insight into the causation of genocide, 
although none is wholly convincing. A brief analysis of 
the crisis in Darfur is made to clarify some of the 
remaining problems in this field. 
El término "genocidio" alude al peor de los crímenes. 
Aunque este concepto implica complejos procesos 
sociales que tienen un gran impacto sobre los 
individuos y las sociedades, ha sido descuidado por los 
científicos sociales. Esto es debido en parte al hecho 
de que la definición internacional de "genocidio" es 
confusa e insatisfactoria, y también en parte a 
problemas metodológicos en la comparación de grandes 
sucesos. El artículo propone una solución metodológica 
a esos problemas —utilizando los tipos ideales de 
Weber— y ofrece una revisión crítica de las principales 
teorías explicativas del genocidio. El artículo concluye 
con la idea de que esas teorías ofrecen una 
considerable comprensión de las causas del genocidio, 
aunque ninguna resulta totalmente convincente. Se 
realiza un breve análisis de la crisis en Darfur con la 
intención de clarificar algunos de los problemas 
remanentes en este campo.     
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1) NEVER AGAIN 
 There have been some fifty genocides since the end of the Second World 
War, according to the leading genocide scholar, Barbara Harff. Genocides have 
caused more civilian deaths in this period than all civil and international wars 
combined. This represents a massive failure on the part of the international 
community, which committed itself, by the UN Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Genocide, adopted in 1948, to eliminate what it called “this odious 
scourge on mankind”. However, the international community has not only failed to 
prevent genocide, but it has also collaborated with it. After the genocide committed 
by the Khmer Rouge government in Cambodia in the 1970s, the Khmer Rouge 
delegate was permitted to keep his seat at the UN as the representative of the 
Cambodian people. The UN did not merely fail to intervene to prevent the genocide 
of 1994 in Rwanda; it worked hard to make sure that there was no effective 
intervention. As I write (June 2006) a genocidal event has taken place in Darfur, 
Sudan, and although a peace agreement between the government and rebel forces 
has been concluded, this has happened too late to save hundreds of thousands of 
lives and the destruction of the way of life of many more. 
 Genocide is the worst of evils. The genocide of European Jews by Nazi 
Germany has cast a shadow over the world since the end of the Second World War. 
The expression “Never Again!” has often been uttered in relation to the Holocaust, 
and has also been applied to other gross human rights violations, such as those 
perpetrated by the military regime in Argentina. Yet “Never Again!” seems to have 
become an empty slogan, as genocide happens again and again and again. The 
international community seems to have little power to fulfil its promise to prevent 
genocide. This presents a major challenge to social scientists, who seek to explain 
the difference between the stated intentions of social actors and the actual outcomes 
of their actions. 
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2) WHAT IS GENOCIDE? 
 In political science certain terms acquire strong positive or negative 
evaluative connotations, and this typically leads to distortions in their uses. Familiar 
examples are “democracy” and “fascism” that have positive and negative 
connotations respectively. “Democracy” acquired such a strong positive connotation 
in the twentieth century (which it had not had before) that the Communist regimes of 
Eastern Europe claimed to be democracies. Even General Franco claimed that his 
regime in Spain was a form of democracy. It has also been common to call anyone a 
“Fascist” if they were perceived to be even slightly authoritarian. The term “genocide” 
has suffered a similar fate. There have been many absurd uses of the term. For 
example, a conservative, British journalist, described the budgetary proposals of the 
Labour Party in the 1992 General Election as “fiscal genocide”, by which he meant 
that the proposed tax rates were higher than he thought desirable. More seriously, 
many events that involve serious human rights violations —especially if they have an 
ethnic dimension— are commonly called “genocide” by politicians and the media. 
Even genocide scholars disagree on the definition of genocide and on whether 
particular events are or are not examples of genocide. Although the US Government 
has described the events in Darfur as “genocide”, and although most genocide 
scholars agree with this judgement, a minority dissents from this. If social scientists 
are to explain the occurrence of genocide, they must obviously develop a clear and 
generally acceptable conception of what genocide is. 
 Fortunately, rather unusually in the history of social theory, we know exactly 
when, how and why the concept of “genocide” was introduced into our political 
vocabulary. In 1944 Raphael Lemkin, a Polish-Jewish international lawyer, working in 
the US State Department, wrote a book on Nazi German war crimes, entitled Axis 
Rule in Occupied Europe. In cataloguing these crimes, Lemkin encountered a 
conceptual problem. He held that war was a social process conducted between 
states. The laws of war regulated the conduct of states. Nazi Germany, however, was 
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waging war against peoples. This was, for Lemkin, evidently a crime, but one that 
was outside the imagination of those who had formulated the laws of war. It was 
therefore a “crime without a name” (as Winston Churchill had called it earlier). Lemkin 
therefore coined the name “genocide” for this crime. He formed the word deliberately 
by analogy with “homicide”. As homicide was the killing of an individual human being, 
so genocide was the killing of a people. However, there was an important difference 
between homicide and genocide. There is only one general way of committing 
homicide: that is, by physically ending an individual’s life. There were two general 
ways of committing genocide: by physically killing all the individuals members of a 
people or, since Lemkin assumed that “peoples” were constituted by their culture, by 
destroying their culture. This distinction derived from Lemkin’s “positive nationalism”, 
that is, his belief that the world consisted of nations, that nations were defined by 
their distinctive cultures, and that these cultures were not only necessary to the well-
being, and indeed the very survival, of peoples, but were a treasure-house of all 
humanity. Thus, genocide was a crime not only against the immediate victims, but a 
crime against humanity. This conceptualization of genocide is important, because it is 
distinctive. It has not generally been followed by later writers on genocide. Usually, 
contrary to Lemkin’s view, mass killing is considered necessary, and sometimes 
sufficient, to call an event genocide. For Lemkin, it was neither necessary nor 
sufficient. For him the essence of the crime was the destruction of nations. Later 
writers on genocide have not shared Lemin’s “positive nationalism”, and have 
consequently emphasised the element of mass killing, and emphasized less the 
element of cultural destruction. One unfortunate consequence of this change of 
emphasis is that `genocide” has almost become a synonym for “massacre”, and has 
lost the distinctive meaning that Lemkin gave it, and that it needs if it is to be a useful 
concept for social and political analysis. 
 Lemkin was seeking to define a crime. His perspective was therefore 
primarily legal. His conceptualization was, however, based on certain more 
theoretical ideas. Genocide was, firstly, a violation of the laws of war, because it 
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involved attacks on peoples and not only on states. It was, secondly, a violation of 
just-war theory, the philosophical basis of the international laws of war, which forbade 
deliberate attacks on non-combatants. Thirdly, it involved massive violations of 
human rights. This is worth noting, because the United Nations was later to make a 
distinction between genocide and human rights, and place them in different 
conventions. Fourthly, genocide was a violation of the rights of peoples. This is the 
most distinctive, and the most controversial, element in Lemkin’s conceptualization, 
because the idea that peoples, and not only individuals, have rights has become a 
strong, but also strongly contested idea in the field of human rights. 
 Lemkin’s conception of “genocide”, therefore, though designed to fill a gap 
in international criminal law, was based on a definite political theory, which has come 
be called “liberal nationalism”. It defended the human rights of individuals (and was 
thus liberal) but also placed a high positive value on national cultures. Liberal 
nationalism has enjoyed a revival in political theory in recent years, but its relation to 
human rights remains problematic, as the relations between its two elements —
liberalism and nationalism— are problematic. 
3) THE UN CONVENTION (1948) 
 As the result of some remarkable lobbying by Lemkin, the UN adopted a 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide on 9 December 1948, 
the day before it adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. During the 
drafting process Lemkin´s original conceptualization was altered in some important 
ways. The ideology that dominated the UN in this period favoured the assimilation of 
national and ethnic minorities into the dominant culture for the sake of defending the 
concepts of the nation-state and common citizenship —an ideology that owed much 
to that of the French Revolution. Governmental representatives were concerned that 
the “cultural” element in Lemkin’s conception would taint their efforts to incorporate 
minority cultures into a common citizenship. This rejection of Lemkin’s cultural 
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nationalism would later return to challenge the UN and its member states, as the 
“identity politics” of ethnonationalism became the most important source of 
international disorder, especially after the end of the Cold War. 
 The other issue that proved to be contentious in the UN drafting process 
was what has come to be called “political genocide”: that is, the deliberate 
destruction of political groups. This lay outside Lemkin’s conception, but was 
favoured by some UN delegates, particularly those from the Western democracies. It 
was opposed, for rather obvious reasons, by the USSR and its allies. It was 
eventually excluded from the UN definition of genocide. This decision has been 
frequently criticized by later genocide scholars, who have usually reinstated it in their 
own definitions. Thus, the definition of genocide in international law differs from that 
most commonly found in the social sciences. Some scholars have coined the term 
“politicide” to leave the legal definition in place, while including “political genocide” in 
the agenda of social science. The pioneering genocide scholar, Leo Kuper, pointed 
out that many conflicts in the world were both ethnic and political, and that it often 
made no sense to distinguish the two elements. The distinction between “ethnic” and 
“political” genocide was therefore untenable. The events in Darfur might support this 
argument. 
 The UN —and therefore the international legal— definition of genocide 
requires at least one of a list of aggressive acts committed against at least one of a 
short list of target groups —national, ethnic, racial or religious— with the intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a group of this kind as such. The key elements of this 
crime are: the intent to destroy; “in whole or in part”; and the group “as such”. The 
element of intent is often ignored in contemporary debates about events, such as 
those in Darfur, that may be genocidal, but the provision that the intent must be to 
destroy the group “in whole or in part” raises the problem of interpreting the term “in 
part”. Even a small attack on one of the target groups might have the intention to 
destroy it “in part” (say an attack on a village), and so the definition is seriously 
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unclear. The combination of the emotional power of the word “genocide” and the 
uncertainty of the definition gives rise to much confused talk about genocide, and 
distracts both scholars and politicians from the terrible realities to which it refers.  
 There is a possible solution to this problem that genocide scholars have so 
far not adopted. The problem lies with the concept of a “definition”. Criminal lawyers 
need relatively precise definitions of crimes, because the rule of law requires that 
citizens know the difference between criminal and non-criminal acts. Social scientists 
often say that they cannot study something until they have defined it, for otherwise 
they would not clearly know what they were studying. However, definitions require us 
to draw lines around things. When the “things” are complex social entities, definitions 
are bound to have uncertain edges. There is an alternative in Max Weber’s concept 
of the “ideal type”. An ideal type is not a definition, but the specification of a set of 
elements that constitute a conceptual ideal example of a thing. All real things will 
resemble the ideal type in some respects, but not in others. Thus, one could specify 
the ideal type of “capitalism”. All actual examples of capitalism would resemble the 
ideal type sufficiently to be types of capitalism, but each would differ from the ideal, 
and from each other, in ways that could be specified rather precisely. Thus, American 
capitalism and Japanese capitalism are both forms of capitalism, but differ in 
respects that can be specified.  
 The ideal type of genocide can be derived from Lemkin’s original 
conception, and consists of the deliberate destruction of a “people” by a state. 
Disputed cases may lack the requisite intention, or target a group that is not a people 
and/or be carried out by non-state actors. The action must resemble the ideal type in 
some significant way to be considered a genocidal event. Nevertheless, this method 
relieves us of the difficulty of deciding whether events, such as those that have taken 
place recently in Darfur, were or were not genocides. We can compare “genocides” 
(that is, events that conform closely with the ideal type) with “quasi-genocides” (those 
that conform less closely, but still closely enough to seem comparable) without 
 Papeles del CEIC vol. 2007/1, marzo 2007 (ISSN: 1695-6494)
Michael Freeman, Never Again! Genocide and the International Community
 CEIC http://www.ehu.es/CEIC/pdf/27.pdfhttp://www.ehu.es/CEIC/pdf/27.pdf
 
(c) Michael Freeman, 2007 
(c) CEIC, 2007, de esta edición —8—
 
worrying about the question as to whether the event is inside or outside our verbal 
definition. 
4) EXPLAINING GENOCIDE 
 It is tempting to classify genocides into those that are internal, in which a 
state seeks to destroy a group within its own jurisdiction, and those that are external, 
for example those committed in campaigns of imperial conquest. The so-called “auto-
genocide” of Cambodia (Democratic Kampuchea) would be an example of an internal 
genocide. The genocides of the Aztecs in Mexico, the Pequot in New England and 
the Tasmanians in Australia might be examples of external genocides. Our standard 
conception of the state as the protector of its people suggests that internal genocides 
are more surprising than, and therefore require different explanations from, external 
genocides. 
 The distinction is, however, more problematic than it first appears to be. Leo 
Kuper made it in his pioneering book, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth 
Century. He stated at the beginning of the book that he would confine himself to 
“domestic” (that is, internal) genocides. Yet the main case that he considers —the 
Nazi genocide of the Jews— was in fact mainly an “external” genocide, since the 
large majority of the Jews killed by the Nazis did not live in Germany and were not 
German. It was, in fact, mainly an “imperialistic” genocide. This is more than a minor 
error by Kuper, because the Holocaust is usually considered to be the “paradigmatic” 
genocide (that is, it is very close to the ideal type), and, if that was external, Kuper 
made a strategic error in according priority to “internal” genocides. 
 There is, however, a more fundamental reason to problematise the 
distinction between internal and external genocides. This is that genocidal events 
sometimes occur precisely because the boundaries between what is internal and 
what is external are in dispute. For example, from the perspective of the US 
Government the “Indian wars” were mainly internal (although it was somewhat 
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ambivalent about this). From the perspective of the indigenous groups it was an 
external war of aggression. The danger of Kuper’s distinction is that, by designating a 
genocide as “internal”, the scholar may be incorporating the ideology of the 
perpetrator as to the way the event should be described. The distinction between 
external and internal genocides may sometimes be useful, but we must be open to 
the possibility that the distinction itself is being called into question. 
 There are four main explanatory theories of genocide. One is weak, and 
has not proved to be fruitful. Two are similar, although they have been developed by 
very different methods. The fourth differs from the previous two in that they are 
“structural” and the fourth is “strategic”. The fourth has different policy implications 
from the others. These four theories do not exhaust all the theories that have been 
proposed, but they are those that have had some influence and seem worth 
considering at this stage of the development of genocide studies. 
 The first explanatory theory is the plural-society approach favoured by 
Kuper. Leo Kuper was a South African sociologist, who had studied ethnic conflict in 
Africa before taking an interest in genocide. He saw genocide, therefore, as an 
extreme form of ethnic conflict. To explain this extreme form, he drew on plural-
society theory, which had some influence at that time. The plural-society theory had 
its origin in the work of J. S. Furnivall, who was interested in the way in which colonial 
powers maintained their rule by importing labour from one colony into another, 
thereby creating an ethnic division of labour in the importing society. This was the 
classic “divide-and-rule” policy, with the added factor that the division was artificially 
created by the rulers to maintain their rule. When the colonial power was forced to 
leave, a “plural society” was left behind. With the colonial power gone, the post-
colonial plural society was very prone to ethnic conflict, since the different ethnic 
groups had different class interests. Kuper defined a plural society as one with at 
least two radically different cultural groups. Cultural groups were “radically” different if 
it was difficult to move from one to the other, for example by marriage. Plural 
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societies were prone to conflict for the kind of reason class-based societies were 
prone to conflict in Marxist theory. For potential conflict to be actualized, Kuper 
argued, there had to be a dominant genocidal ideology that marked out one group for 
victimization. Since many plural societies are not genocidal, the genocidal ideology 
rather than the concept of plural society carried the explanatory burden. The 
explanatory power of this theory is quite weak, however, since neither the plural 
society nor the genocidal ideology, nor the two combined, are nearly sufficient for 
genocide. Plural societies are rarely genocidal, and genocidal ideologies can exist in 
a society with little effect. The plural-society theory itself was subjected to strong 
criticisms, and lost its initial influence. It is worth noting that both Bosnia and Rwanda 
had relatively high marriage rates between members of different ethnic groups, and 
thus might not qualify for the status of plural societies according to Kuper’s 
conception. This turned out to be a dead end in the progress of the theory of 
genocide. 
 The second theory is the state-crisis theory proposed by Robert Melson. 
Melson built his theory on only two cases —the Holocaust and the Turkish genocide 
of the Armenians in 1915— and sought to explain both of these by using the 
structuralist, state-crisis theory that had been developed by Theda Skocpol to explain 
social revolutions. Skocpol sought to explain the occurrence, progress and outcomes 
of three social revolutions: the French Revolution of 1789, the Russian Revolution of 
1917 and the Chinese Revolution, which she controversially dated from 1911. Her 
argument was that cultural factors could not explain these revolutions since they took 
place at different times and in culturally very different contexts. Yet they had striking 
similarities. The explanation for these similarities must therefore be, she argued, that 
the pre-revolutionary regimes must have had similar structures that generated the 
revolutions. The structural theory that she proposed was a modified version of 
Marxism. Influenced by the work of Barrington Moore Jr. (especially his book, The 
Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy), Skocpol argued that Marxism was 
deficient in not taking the state seriously as a partial autonomous actor. What 
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enabled indeed required, the state to be partially autonomous from the class 
structure, and not merely a reflection of it, as Marx suggested, was that it had two 
faces: one face looked into society, and there it saw the class structure. The other 
face looked outwards, and there it saw other, rival states. Because the state had to 
compete successfully with other states to survive, it had to take action to ensure the 
supply of adequate resources to the state, and this might bring the state into conflict 
with the dominant economic class. Precisely when such a conflict occurred, social 
revolution was likely because the oppressed subordinate class would seize the 
opportunity created by the division between the economic and political fractions of 
the ruling elite to press its interests. A social revolution occurred when the 
subordinate class rose up against the dominant class, while at the same time 
alienated political elites challenged the state for its failure to advance the cause of 
the state against its foreign rivals. Skocpol maintained that this structural cause of 
social revolutions explained the French, Russian and Chinese cases, and could do 
so without appealing to culture or ideology as causally important. Melson used this 
theory to explain the genocide of the Armenians and the Holocaust. Both genocides 
followed crises of the state: that of the Ottoman Empire and Weimar Germany. Both 
saw the rise to power of revolutionary challengers —the Young Turks and the 
Nazis— with a mission to reconstruct society to make it a more effective actor in 
international politics. Both were prepared to challenge the dominant economic class 
to do so. Both sought the support of subordinate classes. Both developed ideologies 
of the new order that excluded certain groups —Armenians and Jews. (This use of 
revolutionary ideology makes Melson’s theory at this point more like Kuper’s than 
Skocpol’s, but ideology plays a larger role in Skocpol’s explanation than she herself 
acknowledged). 
 Melson’s theory offers a more plausible explanation of his two cases than 
the plural society did. It does, however, suffer from a number of weaknesses. Firstly, 
it is based on only two cases, and only seeks similarities in the cases based on an 
available theory. The theory is not tested against a significant number of cases, and 
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no attempt is made to find “falsifying” cases, as required by the methodology of Karl 
Popper. Secondly, the concept of state crisis is quite vague, and is treated as an 
objective fact —which is easy to do in retrospect when we know that a revolution or a 
genocide happened— but what is a “crisis” is at least partly a matter of subjective 
interpretation. Thirdly, state crises seem neither necessary nor sufficient for 
genocides. The genocide carried out by Indonesia in East Timor cannot be explained 
by a crisis of the Indonesian state in the Skocpolian manner. In addition, many states 
pass through crises without coming close to committing genocide. Melson goes 
beyond mere descriptive comparison of his two cases to offer a plausible theoretical 
explanation, but as a general, comparative theory of genocide it has serious 
shortcomings. 
 The third recent theory of genocide with some substance is that of Barbara 
Harff. It resembles that of Melson in that it proposes that genocide occurs in times of 
upheaval. Methodologically, however, it is quite different, as it is based on a 
quantitative analysis of all genocides identified since 1955. Harff chose the date 1955 
to eliminate the after-effects of the Second World War. She identified six “risk factors” 
of genocide: 1) the level of upheaval; 2) previous history of genocide in the society; 
3) an exclusionary ideology; 4) a dominant ethnic group; 5) marginality in the world 
system; 6) autocratic government. The more risk factors are presents in society, the 
greater the probability of genocide. If all six risk factors are present, the probability is 
about 90 per cent. State failure alone is associated with a 2.8 per cent probability of 
genocide, so the state-crisis theory alone is shown to be rather weak. The fourth of 
Harff’s risk factors is interesting in relation to plural-society theory. Harff’s study calls 
into question several earlier suggestions, including that of Kuper, that the greater the 
ethnic diversity in society, the greater the level of inter-ethnic violence. Harff found no 
empirical support for this hypothesis —which is good news for multiculturalists— but 
did find that, if one ethnic group in a multi-ethnic society dominated elite positions, 
the probability of genocide was increased. This is relevant to the last theory that we 
shall consider. However, before we proceed to that, a word of caution about Harff’s 
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methodology is needed. Her attempt to combine a concern about genocide with a 
rigorous method of investigation is very admirable, but such quantitative methods 
have limits, and can easily be misinterpreted (Landman, 2006). Small changes in the 
method used can produce significant changes in results. Given the uncertainty about 
the definition of genocide, quantitative results may have a misleading precision. 
Further, each of the risk factors could be interpreted differently by different 
investigators. There is therefore a need to conduct further studies to test the reliability 
of Harff’s results. This is not to diminish her achievement, but to be clear about its 
limits. A surprising omission from Harff’s list of risk factors is the probability of 
external intervention. Much theory suggests that this is significant, and quantitative 
investigations should attempt to measure its causal weight. 
 The final theory is that of Benjamin Valentino. Valentino argues that 
genocide is the product of neither social structures nor mass psychology, but, rather, 
of elite strategies. If elites decide that genocide is the best strategy to achieve their 
goals, they can implement their decision, because societies comply with such 
decisions with little resistance. Valentino argues that this is good news for the 
prevention of genocide, because it is easier to influence elite strategies than to alter 
social structures or mass psychology. Valentino’s method is not quantitative, and so 
it is hard to be sure what independent weight elite strategies have in the causation of 
genocide. Elite decisions to choose genocide as a strategy themselves have causes, 
and it is likely that Harff has identified those causes quite well. Some of them —such 
as the history of genocide in a society— cannot be changed, although they can act 
as warning signs. Others —such as level of upheaval, global marginality and 
autocracy— can in principle be changed, but only with great difficulty. The theories of 
Harff and Valentino are not mutually incompatible, since Harff may identify factors 
that make Valentino’s elite strategies more likely to be chosen. Once they are 
chosen, Valentino may be right that they are likely to be implemented. In a recent, so 
far uncompleted, major study, Mark Levene has argued that genocidal elites often 
have extensive popular support for their actions. Levene’s detailed historical research 
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indicates that popular discontents and attitudes are more important in the causation 
of genocide than Valentino had acknowledged. 
5) DARFUR 
 Recent events in Darfur, Sudan, can be used to test some of these ideas 
and theories. It illustrates firstly the persistent problem of definition. Most observers, 
including genocide scholars, consider that the government of Sudan, and its 
janjaweed militia, have committed genocide in Darfur, although a minority dissents 
from this judgement. My proposal to use Weber’s method of the ideal type sets this 
disagreement aside, since it is clear that the actions of the Sudanese government 
and of the janjaweed resembled genocide sufficiently to suggest that explanations of 
genocide would help to explain the behaviour of these actors. It has also been 
suggested that in Darfur, as in the Rwandan genocide of 1994, rebellion has 
contributed to the causation of the genocide, although those who suggest this are 
emphatic that it does not provide an excuse for genocide. This hypothesis has been 
strongly rejected by other scholars on the basis of detailed analysis of the facts, but it 
is of theoretical interest. Ted Gurr, with whom Harff has previously collaborated in the 
study of genocide, has proposed that state violence is likely to increase as violent 
challenges to the state increase. It is surprising, therefore, that Harff did not include 
this variable in her recent study of genocide. 
 Darfur also raises the question of international intervention. The former US 
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, declared the situation in Darfur to be one of 
genocide, but, although the US has provided humanitarian assistance to the people 
of the region, its policy has hardly taken the idea of genocide seriously. A military 
force of the African Union has been present, but observers generally agree that both 
its mandate and its resources are too weak for it to be effective as a genocide 
prevention force. The UN discusses Darfur, and meanwhile thousands of Darfuris die 
while thousands of others remain at risk. A peace agreement has been concluded 
 Papeles del CEIC vol. 2007/1, marzo 2007 (ISSN: 1695-6494)
Michael Freeman, Never Again! Genocide and the International Community
 CEIC http://www.ehu.es/CEIC/pdf/27.pdfhttp://www.ehu.es/CEIC/pdf/27.pdf
 
(c) Michael Freeman, 2007 
(c) CEIC, 2007, de esta edición —15—
 
between the government of Sudan and most (though not all) the rebel groups, but it 
remains to be seen whether this does or does not resolve the crisis. Here we can see 
the limits of all the theories of genocide that we have been considering. Neither the 
genocide nor the rebellions in Darfur were uncaused, and there is agreement that 
they are rooted in the nature of the Sudanese regime and the historical social and 
economic neglect of Darfur, as well some complex ethnic and economic relationships 
within Darfur. If these are not addressed, the relations between Darfur and the 
central government of Sudan will remain tense, and the potential for conflict, if not 
more genocide, will remain high. 
6) CONCLUSION 
 The concept of “genocide” arose out of a very specific concern: the waging 
of war against peoples rather than states. The United Nations promulgated the 
international law of genocide, but, unfortunately, did so in a way that was both 
unclear and, in the opinion of many lawyers and social scientists, inadequate. There 
is consequently a diversity of definitions of genocide among serious scholars. 
Because the term has become very influential, it has been used in many different 
ways, some of them trivial, by politicians, journalists and the general public. The 
concept, therefore, is in a state of crisis. 
 Nevertheless, terrible realities of a genocidal kind continue to occur, despite 
the repeated vows of the international community to prevent genocide. Even though 
scholars, unsurprisingly, disagree on definitions, theories and methods in the study of 
genocide, progress has been made in understanding this phenomenon. There is a 
consensus that the conditions that make genocide likely are the combination of a 
deep societal crisis, the coming to power of a radical elite, the availability of an 
ideology hostile to vulnerable minority groups, and the unwillingness of powerful 
external actors to intervene. If a principal task of the social sciences is to explain the 
gap between our professed ideals and the realities of our actual social practices, 
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genocide should be one of the most thoroughly studied social phenomena. In fact, it 
is one of the least studied. This is a scandal of the community of social scientists. 
Genocide not only reveals many of the most important interactions among social 
agents, but also challenges many fashionable theories and methodologies of the 
social sciences. The admirable, if flawed, pioneering work of the scholars I have 
reviewed should be supplemented and strengthened by further studies of this vital 
issue of the early twenty-first century. 
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